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| Charles Ponzi, who knew a little light-foot to boot... |
[Ed. – I understand that nearly all the statistical information about goals for/against in what’s below is more revealing than revelatory; I mean, what else would a mid-table team do, but post mid-table numbers?]
The average goals scored in Major League Soccer was 39.2 in 2004, the lowest in league history to that point. Also, you do know what I mean by that phrase, “the average goals scored”? Basically, I wanted to establish the baseline for goals scored for and against in a given season (it’s the same number, obviously…noted because it took me a couple passes), so I can see where each team’s goals for and against landed around that average.
Also, taking suggestions for better phrasing of the concept because I hate that one. Moving on.
By the end of the 2005 MLS season, the average goals scored would rise to a lofty 45.9. Real Salt Lake and Chivas USA joined MLS at the beginning of the year. This wasn’t the reason I started fixating on averages, but, well, it paid off here.
As noted in every post in this series since 2001 (and here’s 2002, 2003, and 2004), a combination of defenses tightening up across MLS and - hear me out – the retirement/decline among the first generation of Marquee players (explained in the 1996 post), conspired to make scoring goals in MLS harder. [Ed. – Did that same process help the American attacking talent that fed the U.S. Men’s Team by giving them more reps and more time to sort out what worked on the field?] This resulted in most teams in the league staying fairly tight against the average on both sides – e.g., goals for and against – through those years and that created a league that was highly competitive (amongst the teams), but that, on the worst Saturdays (aka, late July and August) moved one to think, surely, there is more to life. On the one hand, no team could run away with the title; on the other, the regular season looked like a cartoon reel of the most evil goal-less draws that Hell could engineer. And you had to stare at the hideous gridiron lines for half the season. [Ed. – Honestly, your eyes adjusted, and pretty quickly; it just looked like shit.]
The average goals scored in Major League Soccer was 39.2 in 2004, the lowest in league history to that point. Also, you do know what I mean by that phrase, “the average goals scored”? Basically, I wanted to establish the baseline for goals scored for and against in a given season (it’s the same number, obviously…noted because it took me a couple passes), so I can see where each team’s goals for and against landed around that average.
Also, taking suggestions for better phrasing of the concept because I hate that one. Moving on.
By the end of the 2005 MLS season, the average goals scored would rise to a lofty 45.9. Real Salt Lake and Chivas USA joined MLS at the beginning of the year. This wasn’t the reason I started fixating on averages, but, well, it paid off here.
As noted in every post in this series since 2001 (and here’s 2002, 2003, and 2004), a combination of defenses tightening up across MLS and - hear me out – the retirement/decline among the first generation of Marquee players (explained in the 1996 post), conspired to make scoring goals in MLS harder. [Ed. – Did that same process help the American attacking talent that fed the U.S. Men’s Team by giving them more reps and more time to sort out what worked on the field?] This resulted in most teams in the league staying fairly tight against the average on both sides – e.g., goals for and against – through those years and that created a league that was highly competitive (amongst the teams), but that, on the worst Saturdays (aka, late July and August) moved one to think, surely, there is more to life. On the one hand, no team could run away with the title; on the other, the regular season looked like a cartoon reel of the most evil goal-less draws that Hell could engineer. And you had to stare at the hideous gridiron lines for half the season. [Ed. – Honestly, your eyes adjusted, and pretty quickly; it just looked like shit.]
The same rough dynamic played out in 2005, but the numbers got more elastic. While the three prior seasons (2002 and 2004, in particular) saw 50%+ of the numbers stay within five goals of the average, you couldn’t do the same in 2005 without expanding to seven, even eight goals on either side of the average. The New England Revolution flirted with +10 on goals scored, while D.C. United got past it (they got 58), but the biggest outliers came on goals allowed side of the average, with the expansion teams coming in at -19 (RSL; 65 ga) and -21 (Chivas USA; 67 ga). It could be something else, obviously, but rolling two expansion teams into the league, with both following the classic expansion team model (i.e., they tripped on their way in), feels like a solid explanation for what goosed the scoring.
That's an interesting story too, almost certainly more interesting than what happened in MLS Cup 2005. But certain boxes must be checked. So, how did the “wrong team” win MLS Cup in a run that can feel like a hot streak that neither ends nor makes sense? Before I get to that, some review. For the second season running, two crappier teams beat a better one into the playoffs, and this will take some explaining. With both RSL and Chivas USA joining the Western Conference, MLS shifted the Kansas City Wizards to the Eastern Conference. Now, on the most immediate level, here’s what happened: KC tied both the Colorado Rapids and the Los Angeles Galaxy on points (45), and beat both on goal differential (+8 for KC, +3 for Colorado, and a wtf -1 for LA), out-performed both on goals scored (LA, by a lot), and, in LA’s case, goals allowed (barely). Going the other way, both Colorado and LA won more games than KC – 13 games to 11, in both cases – and that’s a valid tie-breaker, so the conference shift feels like the bigger buzzsaw against KC’s playoff fortunes.
Anyway, the Galaxy won MLS Cup that season, beating what might have been the best New England team of all time(? currently under review) 1-0, and in extra-time. And, as if all the above wasn’t messy enough, the guy who scored the winner was a bust of a Guatemalan forward named, Pando Ramirez (Wikipedia’s entry for the season dubbed him, “Maligned Guatemalan forward”). The only goal he’d scored to that point in MLS (and over quite a few appearances) was a penalty kick he bounced of the San Jose Earthquakes’ Joe Cannon’s back (which means Cannon almost saved it; also, when you give the Timbers’ Dairon Asprilla a late-season PK and he scores it, it hits him like the moon hits a werewolf for the duration of October). Oh, and have I mentioned that San Jose won the Supporters’ Shield that season with the 3rd-best all-time record in MLS history to that point? They had some of the best numbers in the league too: 18-4-10, 53 goals scored, 31 goals against. To repeat a question, the fuck is wrong with this league, man?
But that was probably the least interesting thing that happened that season. If nothing else, the MLS continued the tradition of the conference semifinals and finals having the best post-season games – e.g., when the Chicago Fire knocked off DC United in DC, 4-0, in the second leg of their series, or when the Revs hung on for dear life against that same, hungry Chicago side, with New England ‘keeper Matt Reis standing up Clint Dempsey’s fourth-minute goal, and the Fire having an equalizer called offside (and rightly so) in 2nd half stoppage. In a preview of an MLS Cup final not-so-far into the future, Colorado stalled FC Dallas in the Western Conference Semifinals; the Galaxy, meanwhile, killed Shield-winning San Jose’s dream of a double (also, the spacing in this game...what?), then rolled over the Rapids to MLS Cup. For the record, Landon Donovan scored four of LA’s five playoff goals, aka, how one gets promoted to “difference-maker.”
The last point of interest on MLS Cup: the league handed it to another newly-christened (and only fully-operational in, like, October) soccer-specific stadium, Dallas’ Pizza Hut Park. Yes, I think the name cheapens it too, and the location is dumb. Then again, long drives to get anywhere borders on a cultural trait for Texans...
If I had to pick the most compelling, profound…thing that happened over the 2005 MLS season, I’d go with RSL and Chivas USA’s roster builds – specifically, the different approaches they took. They both ended up in the same place – i.e., bound together in the Western Conference cellar, both with highly similar and equally worthless records. Just to announce the results (for they did not matter), Real Salt Lake beat Chivas 20 points to 18, but, golly, did RSL die down the stretch. (And can we all pause to celebrate the fact that MLSSoccer.com’sForm Guide goes back to 2005 (factually, it goes back to 1996!). For what it’s worth, I still call that the single best resource for anything having to do with anything about Major League Soccer and the real world.) That’s how that’s how they panned out, so let’s talk about those roster builds.
Chivas USA’s was definitely the more exotic; it was also the more flawed roster build in concept between the two, something that (arguably) held until FC Cincinnati joined the league in 2019, grabbing every defensive midfielder they could find on their way in the door. As for Chivas, I’d have to know these players better to say for sure, but it looks like they took the North American model to that time – e.g., mix talented, (super) veteran leadership with promising young players, aka, trust the mentors to develop talent – with the spin being they mostly came from Mexico, or were Mexican-American (with a few exceptions; Ezra Hendrickson got around MLS, y’all). That’s totally on-brand – Chivas de Guadalajara plays only Mexican players as a policy – but pairing “the North American model to that time” with MLS’s salary cap in 2005 (surprisingly hard to find, but, for reference, it was $3.845 million per team in 2017 (sans DPs and the rest of the finagling)) limited the players they could lure out of Mexico, hence that hole in the age/experience sweet-spot on the Chivas USA roster. I only knew Mexican Nationals Team players Ramon Ramirez and Francisco Palencia, but neither well; moreover, Ramirez was 35, which arguably makes a statement about what they expected in MLS. (I got to know Palencia better, who, if I’m remembering right, stuck around in 2006 as a make-up for a poor 2005; respect.) It was a young roster overall, one built to get promising Mexican prospects time in competitive games. Ironically, it never really went well for Chivas until they started stuffing the roster with promising young Americans like Brad Guzan and, later, Sacha Kljestan, or proven, durable players like Jesse Marsch…I think Bob Bradley came to coach them, and that helped too, but you get my point…
For their part, Real Salt Lake mixed taking “proven MLS talent” far too seriously with, I dunno, maybe putting too much trust in how much some could make out of a second chance to build something awesome! (I think that’s the only real pitch for an expansion team, that and any player you’ve signed already). They called in different players for different reasons – e.g., what fan from circa 2000 couldn’t get excited about Jason Kreis and Clint Mathis playing on the same team? – but Eddie Pope was clearly past his prime by then, and that begs questions. They continue from there: I like Rusty Pierce more than a rational adult should, but he never made New England that much better; the same goes for Dante Washington, Chris Brown, and Evan Whitfield; none of them were great players languishing on MLS benches. Then again, what else can you get when you build your roster from an expansion draft in a league that burdened by low scoring over the past 3-5 years?
That’s not to say RSL put every foot wrong – e.g., they landed on Brian Dunseth and Brian Kamler, two reliable players, in which “reliable” means, good enough to start every game and serve their most important role well, but who don’t give much more than that – and I know Andy Williams played a big role for them in the years ahead, just like he reliably contributed for Chicago before joining RSL. But, yeah, it was a shitty roster. It didn’t win many games because it had no business doing so.
And that feels like a good transition to checking in on what the rest of MLS got up to in 2005. What stories continued, what stories ended, what went inexplicably wrong for one team or another (looking at you, Columbus), at least to the extent I can tell. Before I do that, I want to flag one detail that (very anecdotally) seemed to predict success for MLS teams in 2005: teams that could hit the opposition from all over did better in the post-season. That’s a shift (but not a trend) from a couple years earlier (2000 and 2002 stand-out), when a team just needed one or two good attacking players to compete. In 2005, it was the teams with the most varied attack (which, here, I’m interpreting from each players goals and assists, and what I remember about said player), that had the better seasons…except, the Los Angeles Galaxy. Who still won it...same question as above...
Anyway, time to get to it…
Chicago Fire (15-13-4, 49 pts. 49gf, 50 ga (-1); 3rd in East)
Unless I missed a beat, this was Chris Rolfe’s first season with Chicago and, damn, was that kid good (8g, 5a, year 1). Nate Jaqua had a good year (7g, 3a), Justin Mapp finally found his feet (3g, 8a), and Marsch chipped in more goals than you’d guess. The Fire had the parts to scramble a team; they also couldn’t defend well enough…
Chivas USA (4-22-6, 18 pts., 31 gf, 67 ga (-36), last in West)
Covered above, still a failure to launch.
Colorado Rapids (13-13-6, 45 pts., 40 gf, 37 ga (+3), 3rd in West)
They revamped their attack by calling in Jeff Cunningham from Columbus, and he worked out all right (12 g, 3a), but they didn’t have the team to support him, and that lead to another year of relying on defense (third year running?) to carry them. These were dour years in the Rockies.
Columbus Crew (11-16-5, 38 pts., 34 gf, 45 ga (-11), 6th in East)
They had less to complain about than KC, certainly. This was just one of those years where the forwards dried up: Edson Buddle went single-digits (9g, 2a), and Cornell Glen and John Wolyniec aren’t the guys to carry that load. Simon Elliott provided decent helpers, too. Just a big, average, impotent mess.
DC United (16-10-6, 54 pts., 58 gf, 37 ga (+21, league best); 2nd in East, 3rd overall)
I’d forgotten, but this was a good team. Jaime Moreno was still rolling (16g, 7a*), and now he had Christian Gomez as one helluva foil (11g, 9a), and with solid contributions by Santino Quaranta, Freddy Adu (yes, even him), Joshua Gros, and Dema Kovalenko. Unless I missed a beat, this was Bobby Boswell’s first, reputation-building in season in DC, and he made a great partner for Brandon Prideaux. They had great balance across this roster, in construction, age, succession, talent…man, what happened?
FC Dallas (13-10-9, 48 pts., 52 gf, 44 ga (+8), 2nd in East)
Dallas went through a stretch where they’d start hot enough to get people asking whether or not it’s their year, only to fade down the stretch. 2005 was part of that argument. They added Carlos Ruiz from LA – by trading their allocation spot to LA, so they could get Donovan (where he…might have demanded to play) – and he did all right (11g, 2a), but the long-awaited arrival of a spine – e.g., Clarence Goodson, Greg Vanney, and Simo Valakari – fixed the defensive issues that set their ceiling in their two atrocious seasons (written about at length in the…2003 post?). Oh, and Ronnie O'Brien finally had that season I remembered...
LA Galaxy (13-13-6, 45 pts., 44 gf, 45 ga (-1); 4th in West)
I’m starting think that LA has built their success – and it’s still league-leading, right? – on teams made of reliable players described above re RLS, plus a couple stars. Even if it took Pando Ramirez to kick them over the line, Donovan (12g, 10a) and Herculez Gomez (11g, 2a) carried the Galaxy through the regular season in the attack, with Peter Vanegas and Paulo Nagamura backing them up. Those last two: stubborn motherfuckers. LA wasn’t great in 2005, but, so long as they could tighten it up, having Donovan and Gomez meant they could beat anyone. So they did. Speaking of…
New England (17-7-8, 59 pts., 55 gf, 37 ga (+18), 1st in East)
Even with Steve Ralston falling off (oh, he’d be back), Taylor Twellman, Clint Dempsey and Pat Noonan lead one of the most bedeviling attacks in MLS that season. More than that, they signed Rookie of the Year, Michael Parkhurst, who improved the defense so immediately (when fit), gave Jay Heaps the partner he needed, and that cleared the Revs attack to rush forward. Another tragic team, honestly. Felled by Steve Sampson (LA’s coach at the time; I never liked that guy, but only in a social/competence way; I assume he’s nice enough…right?).
NY/NJ MetroStars (12-9-11, 47 pts., 53 gf, 49 ga (+4), 4th in East)
I completely forgot they signed Youri Djorkaeff in ’05, aka, the elegant presence on the 1998 French World Cup winning side. He did all right (10g, 7a) for a (relative) geezer, but Amada Guevara continued to lead the line (11g, 11a) and with Eddie Gaven (8g, 4a), Mike Magee (5g, 5a), and even Sergio Galvan Rey (7g, 0a) in the mix, this was a fun team. When you get right down to it the Eastern Conference was just more fun in 2005.
Real Salt Lake (5-22-5. 20 pts., 30 gf, 65 ga (-35), 5th in West, no playoffs)
See above, mostly, and while this is implied, it bears a clarifying restatement: the then-known U.S. player pool had enough players to support 10 quality teams, but not 12. And a story unfolds from there…probably. Honestly, God knows what’s happening with U.S. Soccer at this point…
San Jose Earthquakes (18-4-10, 64 pts., 53 gf, 31 ga (+22) SS, 1st in West)
San Jose possessed one of the West’s only hydra-head attacks. I mean, look at these numbers: De Rosario (9g, 13a), Ale Moreno (8g, 4a), Brian Ching (7g, 5a), Ronald Cerritos (6g, 9a), Mark Chung (6g, 7a), Brian Mullan (3g, 6a), Brad Davis (2g, 8a). Add a very young, ever-rangy Ricardo Clark behind them, paired with “reliable” utility player, Kelly Gray, and put Danny Califf and Eddie Robinson behind them, and you’ve got a very good team. San Jose factually had a very good team. See future posts…
Kansas City Wizards (11-9-12, 45 pts., 52 gf, 44a (+8), 5th in East, no playoffs)
Whoops, never mind: KC matched San Jose for the hydra-head attack thing (e.g., Josh Wolff (10g, 10a), Scott Sealy (9g, 2a), Chris Klein (7g, 9a), Sasha Victorine (7g, 4a), Davy Arnaud (5g, 4a), and they added Shavar Thomas to the defensive brick at the back. They were in the mix.
That feels like a good take-away for the MLS 2005 season as a whole: I’d call half the teams in MLS as legitimately in the mix. And then you had the Galaxy, and maybe the Dallas Bur…I mean, FC Dallas. I’m not going to pretend I remember many of those games (though I do remember series between Colorado and Dallas, and New England and Chicago getting sharp around this time), but I remember all of those players – even if it takes prompts sometimes (see: Djorkaeff, Youri) – and I remember how dangerous so many of them looked. Even if their best seasons didn't happen in 2005, they'd come, but the point stands: these players made impressions (except Djorkaeff, apparently).
As argued above, expansion allowed that to happen. Something else happened too: when teams started believing and showing they were winners, they could both add better talent and get real value for the good players they didn’t need. No matter how often it shifts – e.g., I haven’t even gotten to the Houston Dynamo’s peak (they don’t even exist yet), but how long has it been since they had a good season? – but teams can ride that momentum for a while. I wonder if 2005 wasn’t the year that started.
Unless I missed a beat, this was Chris Rolfe’s first season with Chicago and, damn, was that kid good (8g, 5a, year 1). Nate Jaqua had a good year (7g, 3a), Justin Mapp finally found his feet (3g, 8a), and Marsch chipped in more goals than you’d guess. The Fire had the parts to scramble a team; they also couldn’t defend well enough…
Chivas USA (4-22-6, 18 pts., 31 gf, 67 ga (-36), last in West)
Covered above, still a failure to launch.
Colorado Rapids (13-13-6, 45 pts., 40 gf, 37 ga (+3), 3rd in West)
They revamped their attack by calling in Jeff Cunningham from Columbus, and he worked out all right (12 g, 3a), but they didn’t have the team to support him, and that lead to another year of relying on defense (third year running?) to carry them. These were dour years in the Rockies.
Columbus Crew (11-16-5, 38 pts., 34 gf, 45 ga (-11), 6th in East)
They had less to complain about than KC, certainly. This was just one of those years where the forwards dried up: Edson Buddle went single-digits (9g, 2a), and Cornell Glen and John Wolyniec aren’t the guys to carry that load. Simon Elliott provided decent helpers, too. Just a big, average, impotent mess.
DC United (16-10-6, 54 pts., 58 gf, 37 ga (+21, league best); 2nd in East, 3rd overall)
I’d forgotten, but this was a good team. Jaime Moreno was still rolling (16g, 7a*), and now he had Christian Gomez as one helluva foil (11g, 9a), and with solid contributions by Santino Quaranta, Freddy Adu (yes, even him), Joshua Gros, and Dema Kovalenko. Unless I missed a beat, this was Bobby Boswell’s first, reputation-building in season in DC, and he made a great partner for Brandon Prideaux. They had great balance across this roster, in construction, age, succession, talent…man, what happened?
FC Dallas (13-10-9, 48 pts., 52 gf, 44 ga (+8), 2nd in East)
Dallas went through a stretch where they’d start hot enough to get people asking whether or not it’s their year, only to fade down the stretch. 2005 was part of that argument. They added Carlos Ruiz from LA – by trading their allocation spot to LA, so they could get Donovan (where he…might have demanded to play) – and he did all right (11g, 2a), but the long-awaited arrival of a spine – e.g., Clarence Goodson, Greg Vanney, and Simo Valakari – fixed the defensive issues that set their ceiling in their two atrocious seasons (written about at length in the…2003 post?). Oh, and Ronnie O'Brien finally had that season I remembered...
LA Galaxy (13-13-6, 45 pts., 44 gf, 45 ga (-1); 4th in West)
I’m starting think that LA has built their success – and it’s still league-leading, right? – on teams made of reliable players described above re RLS, plus a couple stars. Even if it took Pando Ramirez to kick them over the line, Donovan (12g, 10a) and Herculez Gomez (11g, 2a) carried the Galaxy through the regular season in the attack, with Peter Vanegas and Paulo Nagamura backing them up. Those last two: stubborn motherfuckers. LA wasn’t great in 2005, but, so long as they could tighten it up, having Donovan and Gomez meant they could beat anyone. So they did. Speaking of…
New England (17-7-8, 59 pts., 55 gf, 37 ga (+18), 1st in East)
Even with Steve Ralston falling off (oh, he’d be back), Taylor Twellman, Clint Dempsey and Pat Noonan lead one of the most bedeviling attacks in MLS that season. More than that, they signed Rookie of the Year, Michael Parkhurst, who improved the defense so immediately (when fit), gave Jay Heaps the partner he needed, and that cleared the Revs attack to rush forward. Another tragic team, honestly. Felled by Steve Sampson (LA’s coach at the time; I never liked that guy, but only in a social/competence way; I assume he’s nice enough…right?).
NY/NJ MetroStars (12-9-11, 47 pts., 53 gf, 49 ga (+4), 4th in East)
I completely forgot they signed Youri Djorkaeff in ’05, aka, the elegant presence on the 1998 French World Cup winning side. He did all right (10g, 7a) for a (relative) geezer, but Amada Guevara continued to lead the line (11g, 11a) and with Eddie Gaven (8g, 4a), Mike Magee (5g, 5a), and even Sergio Galvan Rey (7g, 0a) in the mix, this was a fun team. When you get right down to it the Eastern Conference was just more fun in 2005.
Real Salt Lake (5-22-5. 20 pts., 30 gf, 65 ga (-35), 5th in West, no playoffs)
See above, mostly, and while this is implied, it bears a clarifying restatement: the then-known U.S. player pool had enough players to support 10 quality teams, but not 12. And a story unfolds from there…probably. Honestly, God knows what’s happening with U.S. Soccer at this point…
San Jose Earthquakes (18-4-10, 64 pts., 53 gf, 31 ga (+22) SS, 1st in West)
San Jose possessed one of the West’s only hydra-head attacks. I mean, look at these numbers: De Rosario (9g, 13a), Ale Moreno (8g, 4a), Brian Ching (7g, 5a), Ronald Cerritos (6g, 9a), Mark Chung (6g, 7a), Brian Mullan (3g, 6a), Brad Davis (2g, 8a). Add a very young, ever-rangy Ricardo Clark behind them, paired with “reliable” utility player, Kelly Gray, and put Danny Califf and Eddie Robinson behind them, and you’ve got a very good team. San Jose factually had a very good team. See future posts…
Kansas City Wizards (11-9-12, 45 pts., 52 gf, 44a (+8), 5th in East, no playoffs)
Whoops, never mind: KC matched San Jose for the hydra-head attack thing (e.g., Josh Wolff (10g, 10a), Scott Sealy (9g, 2a), Chris Klein (7g, 9a), Sasha Victorine (7g, 4a), Davy Arnaud (5g, 4a), and they added Shavar Thomas to the defensive brick at the back. They were in the mix.
That feels like a good take-away for the MLS 2005 season as a whole: I’d call half the teams in MLS as legitimately in the mix. And then you had the Galaxy, and maybe the Dallas Bur…I mean, FC Dallas. I’m not going to pretend I remember many of those games (though I do remember series between Colorado and Dallas, and New England and Chicago getting sharp around this time), but I remember all of those players – even if it takes prompts sometimes (see: Djorkaeff, Youri) – and I remember how dangerous so many of them looked. Even if their best seasons didn't happen in 2005, they'd come, but the point stands: these players made impressions (except Djorkaeff, apparently).
As argued above, expansion allowed that to happen. Something else happened too: when teams started believing and showing they were winners, they could both add better talent and get real value for the good players they didn’t need. No matter how often it shifts – e.g., I haven’t even gotten to the Houston Dynamo’s peak (they don’t even exist yet), but how long has it been since they had a good season? – but teams can ride that momentum for a while. I wonder if 2005 wasn’t the year that started.
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